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REQUIEM FOR A REMEDY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL v. BARTLETT’S
OVER-PREEMPTION
ROBERT C. BAKER III∗
In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered whether generic pharmaceutical manufacturers
could be held strictly liable for unreasonably dangerous, defective drug designs2 when Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations prohibited
the redesign of generic drugs.3 Extending the Court’s impossibility
preemption in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,4 the Court preempted New Hampshire’s “warning-based design-defect cause[s] of action” because generic
manufacturers were unable to cure the defective design under federal law;
dual compliance was “impossible.”5 In so holding, the Court rejected the
compensatory focus of the First Circuit6 and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in
favor of negligence-based, deterrence-centric tort policy.7 As a result, the
© 2015 Robert C. Baker III.
∗
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Basche, Roberto Berrios, and Alyssa Domzal—for their thoughtful feedback and direction. The
author also thanks his family—Robert, Margaret, and Bethany Baker—for their patience, understanding, and encouragement.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
2. Strict products liability is predominantly derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A with a minority of states adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 246 (3d ed. 2015); see also AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 28.1 (John D. Hodson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). New Hampshire adopted
the Restatement Second approach. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473.
3. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (restricting generic manufacturer autonomy).
4. 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011) (preempting failure to warn claims because dual compliance with federal law mandating the existing labeling and state law requiring stronger labeling
was impossible).
5. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477–78.
6. Id. (rejecting the First Circuit’s “stop-selling rationale” in which a manufacturer could
avoid liability by exiting the market).
7. See infra Part IV.A. Deterrence and compensation are conflicting functions of tort law.
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27–29, 37
(1970). Deterrence is best achieved by negligence-based liability; compensation is best ensured
by strict liability. See DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 205–06
(1996) (identifying optimal tort schemes for varied goals). The Supreme Court has not consistently decided which tort function takes precedence. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 471 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s alternating conception of tort-as-regulation versus tort-as-compensation . . . falls
short as a normative prescription for cases yet to be decided . . . [and] begs the institutional ques-
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manufacturers of eighty percent of the drug prescriptions dispensed in the
United States8 are immune from most products liability while a victim’s
ability to recover hangs on a pharmacist’s whim.9
While correctly decided under New Hampshire’s negligence-based
“strict”10 products liability, expansive application of Bartlett in other jurisdictions has led to over-simplistic preemption of long-established tort
schemes.11 To protect traditional conceptions of fault12 from the dissent’s
reformist law and economic policy, the Bartlett Court employed deterrencecentric reasoning to cast compensatory tort policy into a straw man of absolute liability.13 The resulting anti-compensatory holding invited subsequent
courts’ preemption of distinguishable tort regimes.14 The Court, instead,
should have curtailed its rejection of compensatory tort policy in deference
to states that have adopted “stricter”15 products liability under modern principles of federalism.16 Though inapplicable to New Hampshire, the compensatory law and economic policy of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent lends legitimacy to states’ decisions to maintain “stricter” liability regimes.17
tion of who should decide the critical regulatory policy issues at the heart of the . . . preemption
inquiry.”).
8. IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE
UNITED
STATES:
REVIEW
OF
2011
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/Insights/IMS%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%
20Informatics/IHII_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.pdf) (“generics . . . represent[] 80% of dispensed prescriptions”).
9. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67988 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0001 (“access to the courts
is dependent on whether an individual is dispensed a brand name or generic drug”); see infra Parts
II.C, III (discussing preemption of all products liability except manufacturing defects).
10. Traditional strict liability was distinguishable from negligence. See infra Part II.C and
text accompanying note 157.
11. E.g., Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014) (preempting
Maryland’s consumer expectations approach without state-specific analysis). The consumer expectations approach is older and traditionally “stricter” than modern approaches. See infra Part
IV.C.
12. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 395 A.2d 843, 845–46 (discussing New Hampshire’s fault system). Fault is a vehicle of deterrence, not compensation. See Guido Calabresi,
Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 750 (2005).
13. See infra Part IV.A. Law and economics not only “seeks to explain the law, or the legal
system, as it is,” it provides an avenue for normative analysis to describe how the law should be.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (8th ed. 2011); Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85, 91 (2005).
14. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
15. Perhaps when states first adopted strict products liability it was truly “strict,” meaning
that courts did not use negligence principles in their analyses, but strict product liability doctrine
has drifted towards negligence as state common law diverged. See infra Part IV.C, note 157 and
accompanying text. Thus negligence, strict liability, and absolute liability are best thought of on a
spectrum rather than as distinct doctrines with the term “stricter” reflecting the degree of drift.
16. See infra Part IV.A (discussing federalism).
17. See infra Part IV.B.
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In response to the Court’s expansive generic pharmaceutical preemption, the FDA proposed a rule that undermines the impossibility preemption
reasoning of PLIVA and Bartlett.18 Specifically, the rule would permit generic manufacturers to unilaterally change their labeling like their brandname counterparts.19 Though the rulemaking would render Bartlett moot,
analysis of the law and economic ideologies shaping the Court’s decisionmaking is instructive for predicting the Court’s future preemption of
tort law.20
I. THE CASE
Shortly after beginning a regimen of prescription sulindac,21 Karen
Bartlett experienced a severe cutaneous hypersensitivity reaction that presented as burn-like wounds on sixty-five percent of her body.22 Ms. Bartlett
was hospitalized for seventy days, much of which she spent in a medically
induced coma.23 She suffered permanent esophageal, vaginal, and pulmonary injuries that prevent normal eating, sexual relations, and aerobic activity; she also suffers from near-blindness and severe disfigurement.24 Ms.
Bartlett’s condition necessitated several surgeries and cost millions of dollars in medical expenses.25
At the time of Ms. Bartlett’s injury, sulindac carried a general warning
against “severe skin reactions” and was a known cause of her condition,

18. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products; Public Meeting; Request for Comments; Reopening of the Comment Period, 80
Fed.
Reg.
8577
(February
11,
2015),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0081;
see
also
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67989, 67995 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0001.
19. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67989.
20. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.D.
21. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010) aff’d, 678 F.3d 30
(1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). Sulindac is a generic, anti-inflammatory pain reliever manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceuticals. Id.
22. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466
(2013). Ms. Bartlett developed Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and later toxic epidermal necrosis
(SJS/TEN), which is characterized by a severe burn-like rash causing dermal separation. Id.;
Robert A. Schwartz et al., Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis: Part I. Introduction, History, Classification, Clinical Features, Systemic Manifestations, Etiology, and Immunopathogenesis, 69 J. AM.
ACAD. DERMATOL. 173.e1, 173.e2 (2013).
23. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34, 43.
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id. (noting that Bartlett has had twelve surgeries on her eyes alone with more anticipated); Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 231 (D.N.H. 2011) aff’d, 678 F.3d 30 (1st
Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (delineating compensatory damages for medical expenses
as approximately $3.5 million).
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Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrosis (“SJS/TEN”).26
In fact, one of the preeminent SJS/TEN epidemiological studies available at
the time specifically implicated sulindac as associated with more reported
cases of SJS/TEN than any other pharmaceutical in its drug class.27 Partially because of this study, the FDA later strengthened sulindac’s labeling to
explicitly warn against SJS/TEN.28
Ms. Bartlett brought suit under New Hampshire law advancing numerous tort theories, though only one survived summary judgment: she alleged
that the manufacturer was strictly liable for marketing an “unreasonably
dangerous” product.29 Importantly, Ms. Bartlett’s failure-to-warn claims
failed on case-specific grounds because Ms. Bartlett’s prescribing physician
never reviewed sulindac’s label.30 After a three-week trial, the jury found
Mutual Pharmaceutical strictly liable for a design defect and awarded Ms.
Bartlett twenty-one million dollars in damages.31 In response, Mutual
Pharmaceutical renewed its motion for judgment alleging that Ms. Bartlett’s
design defect claims were preempted by federal regulations prohibiting a
manufacturer from redesigning generic sulindac.32
The district court denied Mutual Pharmaceutical’s motion and concluded, “[f]ederal law did not require Mutual to sell sulindac. Nor, for that
matter, did state law require Mutual to stop selling it, or to redesign it.”33
Instead, state law created liability for selling a product with greater risks
than benefits.34 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Mutual Pharmaceutical could avoid liability by choosing to stop
26. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34; Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
27. Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (citing Maja Mockenhaupt et al., The Risk of SJS and
TEN Associated with NSAIDs: A Multinational Perspective, 30 J. RHEUMATOLOGY 2234 (2003)).
28. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2013) (explaining that a class warning of SJS/TEN was added to all prescription NSAID labeling).
29. Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 143. Bartlett initially brought suit in New Hampshire Superior Court but the case was removed by Mutual Pharmaceutical. Id. Bartlett originally brought
claims for breach of warranty, negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm.
Co., 08-CV-00358-JL, 2010 WL 3659789, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 14, 2010) (granting summary
judgment); Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 143 n.3, 151.
30. Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 146. At his deposition, Bartlett’s prescribing physician testified that he never reviewed nor was influenced in any way by sulindac’s labeling so specific causation could not be established. Id.
31. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 227, 231 (D.N.H. 2011) aff’d, 678 F.3d
30 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (“$21.06 million in damages, consisting of . . .
$16.5 million for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life”). The jury concluded that sulindac’s risks outweighed its benefits making it a defective product unreasonably dangerous to
consumers. Id. at 227.
32. Id. at 227, 247–48.
33. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
34. Id. The court cites an underlying order stating: “strict products liability requires . . . that
manufacturers compensate consumers for the damage caused by unreasonably dangerous products, not necessarily that they remove such products from the market.” Id. (quoting Bartlett v.
Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 08-CV-358-JL, 2010 WL 3092649, at *8 (D.N.H. Aug. 2, 2010)).
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selling the drug.35 The court noted, however, that a “developing split in [the
preemption jurisprudence of] the lower courts” required decisive resolution
by the Supreme Court.36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether federal law preempts New Hampshire’s design defect cause of action.37
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In PLIVA v. Mensing, the Supreme Court preempted strict products liability when generic pharmaceutical manufacturers could not comply with
both the common law and the FDA’s restrictive regulatory framework. The
PLIVA Court, however, did not address the First Circuit’s stop-selling rationale. Part II.A of this Note discusses the regulatory framework governing generic pharmaceuticals. Part II.B outlines the development and current
trends in design-defect strict products liability. Part II.C examines the
Court’s rejection of impossibility preemption for brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers in Wyeth v. Levine38 and its apparent reversal for generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers in PLIVA v. Mensing.
A. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enacted a Rigid Approval
Process for Generic Pharmaceuticals That Requires Complete
Duplication of the Branded Drug
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)39 requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to gain approval from the FDA prior to marketing a
drug.40 Under the FDCA, New Drug Applications (“NDA”) may only be
approved after rigorous FDA vetting, including comprehensive clinical testing, labeling, pharmacovigilance, and risk-benefit analyses.41 To foster
competition in the pharmaceutical market, the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the “Hatch35. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37–38, 44 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466
(2013).
36. Id. at 38, 44.
37. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470, 2472 (2013) (citing Mut. Pharm. Co.
v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012)).
38. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
39. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (requiring approval from the FDA for all drugs introduced in
to interstate commerce).
41. Id. §§ 355(b)(1)(A), 355(b)(1)(F), 355(d); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(c)(2)(i), 314.50(c)(2)(ix),
314.50(d)(2), 314.50(d)(5)(iv), 314.50(d)(5)(viii)(2014). Mirroring a risk-utility test, the FDA
only considers a drug safe when the “probable therapeutic benefits . . . outweigh [the] risk of
harm.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 140 (2000). An NDA is a
costly, multi-year iterative process culminating in a multi-thousand page application. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT 6–8 (2006), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-49/content-detail.html; see also Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471.
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Waxman Act,”42 created an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”)
to expedite approval of generic versions of approved, brand-name, NDAs.43
Under the ANDA framework, a generic pharmaceutical may be approved
without the same level of testing as long as it is identical to the NDA reference drug.44
While the Hatch-Waxman Act sets out in detail the ANDA approval
process, it is silent regarding post-approval pharmacovigilance or other
maintenance.45 Instead, the Act includes an enabling clause in which the
FDA “shall promulgate . . . such regulations as may be necessary for the
administration of [the Act].”46 Subsequent FDA regulations curbed ANDA
manufacturer autonomy and warned that approval may be withdrawn if
ANDA labeling deviates from the reference NDA.47 FDA regulations require pre-approval for all “major” NDA changes with only narrow express
exceptions.48 One such exception, commonly known as the changes-beingeffected (“CBE”) provision, allows manufacturers to unilaterally strengthen
labeling to reflect newly acquired safety information.49 The FDA also requires ongoing pharmacovigilance and periodic reporting for both NDA and
ANDA applications.50
B. The “Unreasonably Dangerous” Standard of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts Has Developed into Two Distinct Tests to
Calculate Strict Products Liability
Modern strict products liability is derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A providing that: “[o]ne who sells any product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is
42. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j); H.R. REP. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.
44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). For purposes of the statute, identical means chemically equivalent, id. § 355(j)(2)(A), bioequivalent in rate of absorption, id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv), and labelingequivalent, id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v). Any variations, however, trigger additional testing. Id.
§ 355(j)(2)(C). The regulations refer to the reference listed drug (“RLD”) not the NDA drug because competitively marketed pharmaceuticals may have multiple NDAs. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3
(2014) (defining “Reference listed drug”); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS x–xi (35th ed. 2014), available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 22, 2015) (discussing RLDs).
45. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (limiting discussion to the initial application process).
46. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act § 105(a).
47. 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (2014). The regulation excepts deviations that are explicitly
permitted. Id.
48. Id. § 314.70(b)–(d) (outlining “major,” “moderate,” and “minor” changes).
49. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568–69 (2009) (analyzing
the provision).
50. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80–314.81.
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subject to liability.”51 To identify “unreasonably dangerous” “defective
condition[s],” two distinct tests emerged: the consumer expectations test
and the risk-utility test.52 The consumer expectations test developed from
comments g and i of Section 402A.53 The test defined an unreasonably
dangerous defective condition as “dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer . . . with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community.”54 The risk-utility balancing test
instead adopted a manufacturer-oriented approach; common considerations
include: the usefulness and benefit of the product; the likelihood and severity of danger; and the feasibility, availability, and reasonableness of preventative measures or an alternative design.55
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability officially adopts
factors of the risk-utility test, including concepts of reasonableness, foreseeability, negligence, and reasonable alternative design.56 These factors
translate into a restrictive negligence framework diametrically opposed to a
consumer expectations approach.57 For example, under the Restatement
Third, a drug is only defective if a health care provider “would not prescribe
the drug . . . for any class of patients.”58 As of yet, the Restatement Third
remains only sparsely followed among the states.59
C. Juxtaposing Wyeth v. Levine and PLIVA v. Mensing,
Pharmaceutical Tort Liability Turns upon Impossibility Preemption
In Wyeth, the Supreme Court chose not to apply impossibility preemption to failure-to-warn tort liability against brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturers.60 The Court reasoned that the CBE provision of 21 C.F.R.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
52. E.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2013) (applying New Hampshire’s risk-utility test); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343–53, 363 A.2d 955, 958–
63 (1976) (adopting a consumer expectations approach).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. g & i (1965).
54. Id. at cmt. i.
55. See, e.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474–75 (outlining risk-utility test); see also Vautour v.
Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001) (“[W]hile proof of an alternative design is relevant in a design defect case, it should be neither a controlling factor nor an essential element that must be proved in every case.”).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998); see id. cmt. a
(“[s]ubsections (b) and (c), which impose liability for products that are defectively designed or
sold without adequate warnings or instructions and are thus not reasonably safe, achieve the same
general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence”).
57. Compare id. § 6(c) (restricting liability), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. i (1965) (conditioning liability on ordinary consumer expectations).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998).
59. See infra Part IV.C.
60. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009). Wyeth arose out of defective labeling of an
intravenous (IV) antihistamine used to treat nausea. Id. at 559–60. At the time of injury, the drug
labeling permitted two methods of administration: (1) via a shot directly into a patient’s vein, or
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314.70(c)(6)—that allowed pharmaceutical companies to unilaterally
change their labels without FDA pre-approval—foreclosed impossibility
preemption.61 The Court further refused to recognize federal objective
preemption by the FDA approval process.62 The Court reasoned that if
Congress believed state lawsuits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it
would have enacted express preemption as it had for medical devices.63
The Court noted that, traditionally, state tort claims were considered complementary to FDA regulation: serving to supplement the FDA’s limited resources by incentivizing manufacturers with “superior access” to postmarket data to identify new risks.64 Under this approach, FDA approval
serves as a floor for safety, not a ceiling.65
Justice Thomas concurred in judgment expressing a strong distaste for
what he termed “implied pre-emption doctrines.”66 Justice Thomas instead
favored narrower impossibility preemption.67 Arguing federal objective
preemption, Justice Alito’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, proposed that “the real issue is whether a state tort jury can
countermand the FDA’s considered judgment” that a warning renders a
drug safe.68 Justice Alito found juries “ill equipped to perform the FDA’s
cost-benefit-balancing function.”69

(2) by first inserting an IV-drip and then administering through the drip. Id. at 559. The drug labeling warned that the medication would cause irreversible damage if it escaped the vein; the IVdrip method ameliorated this risk. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the labeling should have foreclosed the direct “shot” method as unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 560.
61. Id. at 570–73. Wyeth argued the CBE provision was only implicated when new information was acquired and furthermore that the CBE provision conflicts with the misbranding regulations. Id. at 568–70. The Court did not adopted this “cramped reading of the CBE regulation.”
Id. at 570–72.
62. Id. at 573–75, 581.
63. Id. at 574–75. “Congress could have applied the pre-emption clause to the entire FDCA.
It did not do so, but instead wrote a pre-emption clause that applies only to medical devices.” Id.
(quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 327 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 578–79 (“[T]he FDA long maintained that state law offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation.”).
65. See id. at 573–74, 578–79 (discussing purpose of regulation).
66. Id. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“In particular, I have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence. . . . [I]mplied
pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text are inconsistent with the Constitution . . . .”).
67. Id. at 589–90, 593–94. Justice Thomas expressed a novel twist on impossibility preemption that would foreshadow his opinions in PLIVA and Mutual. See id. at 590 (questioning the
“physical impossibility” standard and noting that a “logical-contradiction” standard may prove
more apt (quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260–61 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68. Id. at 605 (Alito, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 626.
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In PLIVA v. Mensing,70 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held
that state failure-to-warn claims against generic pharmaceutical manufacturers were in impossible conflict with federal law, precluding manufacturers from controlling their labeling.71 The PLIVA Court explained that the
state tort law requires manufacturers who are aware, or should be aware, of
a “product’s danger to label that product in a way that renders it reasonably
safe.”72 Federal law, however, requires generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to adopt labeling identical to the branded version of the drug.73 The
plaintiffs argued that generic manufacturers could have unilaterally changed
their labels via the CBE provision or issued “Dear Doctor” letters to inform
prescribing physicians of the danger.74 The FDA, under Auer75 deference,
rejected both contentions, and instead asserted that federal law created a
manufacturer duty to propose stronger labels to the FDA if the manufacturers believed they were warranted.76 The Court, however, held that the
proper question for impossibility analysis “is whether the private party
could independently do under federal law what state law requires of it,” not
whether the party could possibly influence a consistent result.77 Since the
generic manufacturer could not independently change the labeling under
federal law, the state claims were preempted, creating an “unfortunate” disparity between brand and generic tort liability.78

70. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). The controversy in PLIVA, arose from the discovery that Reglan,
a drug to aid digestion, was found to be causally related to tardive dyskinesia, a neurological disorder, in patients engaging in long-term therapy (incidence of twenty-nine percent). Id. at 2572.
The plaintiffs developed the condition before the FDA strengthened the warning labeling and sued
the generic manufacturer for failure to warn in the face of “mounting evidence.” Id. at 2572–73
(quoting Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2009)).
71. Id. at 2580–81.
72. Id. at 2573.
73. Id. at 2574 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(v), 355(j)(4)(G), 314.94(a)(8),
314.127(a)(7) (2014)).
74. Id. at 2575–76. “Dear Doctor” letters contain direct warnings sent to healthcare professionals. Id. at 2576.
75. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Under Auer, the FDA is granted deference in its
interpretation of its own regulations unless “‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989)).
76. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–77. The FDA interpreted the misbranding provision of 21
U.S.C. § 314.150(b)(10) (2012)—withdrawing ANDA approval for deviating from the brand labeling—to foreclose changes via the CBE provision or the proposed “Dear Doctor” letters.
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–76. The FDA sought to undermine preemption by interpreting the
misbranding provision to impose a duty to notify the FDA of potential product dangers. Id. at
2576–77. The Court, however, found preemption regardless of this duty. Id. at 2577–78 (finding
an additional duty did not resolve impossibility).
77. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2579.
78. Id. at 2581 (“We recognize that . . . finding pre-emption here but not in Wyeth makes little sense. Had [plaintiffs] taken . . . the brand-name . . . their lawsuits would not be pre-empted.
But because pharmacists . . . substituted generic metoclopramide instead, federal law pre-empts
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court reversed
the First Circuit79 and, extending PLIVA v. Mensing,80 preempted “warningbased design-defect causes of action” against generic drug manufacturers.81
The Court reasoned that New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action
created a manufacturer duty to comply with an impossible state safety
standard under federal law.82 The dissenting opinions asserted no such affirmative duty and instead reasoned that a manufacturer could comply with
state law by paying damages even if it took no action to comply with the
heightened state safety standard.83
The Court adopted a process of elimination approach to find impossibility preemption.84 Specifically, the Court reasoned that New Hampshire
common law created an affirmative duty for manufacturers to ensure that
their products were not “unreasonably dangerous,”85 then determined that
every option available to comply with that duty was prohibited by federal
law.86 New Hampshire applies a risk-utility balancing test to identify unreasonably dangerous products.87 The test does not technically include set
factors; the Court, however, applied the three factors that the New Hampshire Supreme Court has repeatedly used: (1) “the usefulness and desirability of the product,” (2) whether the product’s risks can be reduced without
affecting its cost or effectiveness, and (3) the “efficacy of a warning to
avoid . . . unreasonable . . . harm from hidden dangers or foreseeable uses.”88 The Court reasoned that sulindac’s usefulness and risk profile could
only be improved by changing the drug’s chemical composition.89 Sulindac’s composition, however, could not be altered under federal law.90
these lawsuits. We acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation has dealt
[plaintiffs] . . . .” (citations omitted)).
79. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013).
80. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572; see also supra notes 70–72, 78 and accompanying text (discussing the PLIVA holding).
81. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477.
82. Id. at 2473–77. The Court derives the state safety standard, that manufacturers must not
sell unreasonably dangerous products, from the assessment of liability. Id. at 2474.
83. Id. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 2488, 2491 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (dichotomizing duties and incentives).
84. Id. at 2473–78 (majority opinion).
85. Id. at 2473–74 (noting that New Hampshire has adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A).
86. See id. at 2473–78.
87. Id. at 2474.
88. See id. at 2474–75 (quoting Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178,
1182 (N.H. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2475; see also supra Part II.A (summarizing FDCA regulations). The Court also
concluded sulindac’s simple, single ingredient, composition was chemically incapable of redesign.
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475.
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Since improving the first two factors was legally impossible, the Court concluded that Mutual Pharmaceutical’s only remaining option was to
strengthen sulindac’s labeling.91 Relying on PLIVA, the Court then found
strengthening the labeling similarly impossible.92 Therefore, the Court held
that New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action was “without effect”
under the Supremacy Clause because every available avenue to comply
with the common law duty was prohibited under federal law.93
The Court rejected the lower courts’ “‘stop-selling’ rationale” because
of its destructive consequences on preemption jurisprudence.94 The Court
noted that if exiting the market undermined a claim of impossibility, impossibility preemption would be rendered meaningless; ceasing to act would be
available in every previous case in which the Court found a “direct conflict”
between federal and state laws.95 As an example, the majority cited PLIVA
as squarely at odds with the “stop-selling rationale.”96
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor contended that, properly applied,
preemption principles posed no barrier to recovery.97 Justice Sotomayor
advanced a literal reading of impossibility preemption, defining impossibility as two “irreconcilable affirmative requirements” imposed by state and
federal laws.98 She contended that New Hampshire’s design defect cause of
action “does not require that the manufacturer take any specific action.”99
Instead, she reasoned that New Hampshire common law liability only permits or incentivizes compliance.100 Justice Sotomayor explained that, unlike
a legal mandate, exposure to liability does not leave a party no choice but to
comply.101 Applying this distinction, Justice Sotomayor distinguished
PLIVA on the grounds that the Minnesota and Louisiana law in PLIVA “undisputed[ly]” mandated stronger labeling102 whereas New Hampshire’s law
only exposed Mutual Pharmaceutical to liability.103
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2476.
93. Id. at 2476–77 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 2477–78.
95. Id. at 2477.
96. Id. at 2478 (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577–78 (2011)).
97. Id. at 2483–84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2485, 2488 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 2488.
100. Id. at 2485–86. Justice Sotomayor acknowledges that an incentive may still implicate
express preemption, field preemption, or pose an obstacle to a federal objective. Id. She further
qualified that “common-law duties may qualify as ‘requirements,’” but asserted that no such “duty” was created by the text of New Hampshire’s law. Id. at 2489 n.5.
101. Id. at 2488.
102. Id. at 2489 (quoting PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2573 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. Justice Sotomayor also authored the dissent in PLIVA where she contended generic
manufacturers could avoid impossibility by petitioning the FDA. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2587–88.
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Justice Sotomayor contended that the majority wrongly assumed that
manufacturers must have an option to avoid liability other than exiting the
market or paying compensation as a cost of doing business.104 States, she
argued, have the right to ensure compensation for their citizens, and federal
law does not grant a manufacturer an absolute right to continue marketing
pharmaceuticals free from liability.105 Justice Sotomayor added that tort liability serves important functions, including assisting the FDA with drug
safety106 and “perform[ing] an important remedial role in compensating”
victims.107 After rejecting literal impossibility preemption, Justice Sotomayor considered and dismissed federal objective preemption.108
In reaction, the majority distinguished between strict and absolute liability, reasoning that strict liability “signals a breach of duty” whereas absolute liability “merely serves to spread risk.”109 The majority, relying on
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,110 noted that “most common-law causes of action
for . . . strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but rather to impose
affirmative duties.”111 Consonant with Riegel, the majority asserted that
New Hampshire’s products liability jurisprudence had consistently held that
a manufacturer bears a “duty to design [its] product reasonably safely for
the uses which [it] can foresee.”112 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
New Hampshire Supreme Court had cautioned “that the term ‘unreasonably
dangerous’ should not be interpreted so broadly as to impose absolute liability on manufacturers.”113 The Court emphasized that in New Hampshire
“liability without negligence is not liability without fault.”114
104. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2489, 2491, 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2491 (noting an exception if the law poses an obstacle to a federal objective).
106. Id. at 2485. The FDA alone is incapable of detecting adverse events with low incidence
and long latency; state tort law provides an incentive. Id. at 2284–85. Furthermore, tort suits
“‘serv[e] as a catalyst’ to identify previously unknown drug dangers.” Id. at 2485 (quoting Bates
v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005)).
107. Id. (quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002)).
108. Id. at 2493–94. Consistent with Justice Sotomayor, Justice Breyer’s dissent also adopts a
literal reading of impossibility preemption. Id. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
lends greater weight to federal objective preemption, but, like Justice Sotomayor, rejects it is as
inapplicable in Bartlett. Id. at 2481–82.
109. Id. at 2473 (majority opinion) (asserting that the respondent conflates strict liability and
absolute liability).
110. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
111. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (reasoning that medical device causes of action in Riegel
imposed requirements preempted by federal law).
112. Id. at 2473 (quoting Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 847 (N.H. 1978)).
Thibault explicitly rejected the notion of strict liability as “a tool of social engineering” and concluded that “[u]nlike workmen’s compensation . . . strict liability is not a no-fault system of compensation.” Thibault, 395 A.2d at 845–46.
113. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 (quoting Price v. BIC Corp., 702 A.2d 330, 333 (N.H. 1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. (quoting Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett was correctly decided given New
Hampshire’s negligence-based strict products liability, but invited overexpansive preemption of distinguishable state tort-law schemes with its emphatic rejection of Justice Sotomayor’s Calabresian law and economic policy.115 Rather than tailor its holding to New Hampshire, the Court safeguarded deterrence-centric policy goals by rejecting compensatory
considerations as a form of absolute liability.116 The Court erred in both its
mischaracterization of compensation and its implicit failure to recognize
states’ right to experiment with fault under modern principles of federalism.117
While the extension of PLIVA adds little doctrinally to the Court’s jurisprudence, the discussion of law and economic tort policy unveils a deep
divide over the supremacy of fault.118 Four dissenting justices would have
imposed liability regardless of Mutual Pharmaceutical’s inability to take
preventive action.119 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, would
reject fault entirely and rebuild tort liability from a Calabresian tabula rasa.120 Though not adopted, and certainly inconsistent with fault, Justice Sotomayor’s Calabresian policies legitimize states’ decisions to preserve traditional, “stricter” products liability.121
The Bartlett Court’s conclusion that manufacturers must have an avenue to escape strict liability has led to expansive preemption of distinguishable strict liability schemes.122 Rather than evaluate specific conflicts with
state common-law duties, the lower courts have interpreted Bartlett to require preemption whenever a pharmaceutical manufacturer cannot increase
product safety under federal law.123 This approach effectively rejects the

115. See infra Part IV.A. Justice Sotomayor was a student of Professor Calabresi and a fellow
judge on the Second Circuit for ten years. Jo Becker & Adam Liptak, Sotomayor’s Blunt Style
TIMES
(May
28,
2009),
Raises
Issue
of
Temperament,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/us/politics/29judge.html?pagewanted=all; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27websotomayor.html?pagewanted=all.
116. See infra Part IV.A.
117. See infra Part IV.A.
118. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 749 (“[T]here is prima facie inefficiency in the fault system. That is, if the fault system worked, one would never find fault liability.”).
119. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480, 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting with Kagan, J., joining); id. at
2482, 2486 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting with Ginsburg, J., joining).
120. See infra Part IV.B. Law and economics, as a field, originated in the seminal work of
Judge Guido Calabresi—The Cost of Accidents—in which Calabresi used economics to theorize a
system of tort liability to reduce the cost of accidents more efficiently than fault. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 26; Calabresi, supra note 12, at 748; Hylton, supra note 13, at 85.
121. See infra Part IV.B.
122. See infra Part IV.C.
123. See infra Part IV.C.
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“stricter” liability still assessed by a minority of states and mandates a negligence-based approach to strict products liability.124
In the wake of Bartlett and PLIVA, the FDA proposed a rule to bring
generic pharmaceutical liability into parity with branded manufacturers.125
The rule would extend the CBE exception to allow generic manufacturers to
unilaterally change warning labeling.126 The rule represents an express reversal of the FDA’s amicus position in PLIVA.127 Nevertheless, the FDA
position, if finalized, will likely be granted deference and have a lasting effect on the generic pharmaceutical industry.128 If precedent is any indication, once the impossible conflict with state law is removed, a majority of
the Court will be unable to coalesce behind an alternate theory of preemption.129
Part IV.A discusses the Court’s rejection of Calabresian absolute liability. Part IV.B assesses the viability of Justice Sotomayor’s compensatory tort policy, legitimizing competing tort schemes preempted post-Bartlett.
Part IV.C examines the negative impact of Bartlett’s over-expansive profault reasoning originating with the preemption of Maryland’s consumer
expectations approach and extending to similarly situated jurisdictions.
Part IV.D outlines the FDA’s attempt to reverse PLIVA and Bartlett and
predicts the likely impact if its rule is finalized.
A. The Bartlett Court’s Negligence-Based Tort Policy Proves
Dispositive in New Hampshire but Should Not Extend to States
That Maintain “Stricter” Products Liability
The Court should have limited its inquiry to the inconsistency between
the First Circuit’s “stop-selling rationale” and New Hampshire law.130 Instead, in response to Justice Sotomayor’s argument for compensation, the
Court rejected compensatory policy as absolute liability and narrowly construed strict products liability through a negligence-based conception of
fault.131 The resulting mischaracterization of strict and absolute liability en-

124. See infra Part IV.C.
125. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013).
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
128. See infra Part IV.D.
129. See infra Part IV.D.
130. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74, 2477–78 (2013) (discussing
the inconsistencies).
131. See, e.g., id. at 2470, 2477 (reasoning that the stop-selling rationale would render impossibility preemption a “dead letter”); see also OWEN, supra note 2, at 245 (discussing the overlap
between modern strict liability and negligence).
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couraged over-simplistic, categorical preemption of “stricter”132 liability
state regimes.133
1. The Bartlett Court Should Have Limited Its Reasoning to New
Hampshire’s Negligence-Based, Majority Approach to Strict
Products Liability
The New Hampshire Supreme Court expressly rejected interpretations
of its design-defect cause of action that impose absolute liability or liability
without fault.134 Instead, New Hampshire adopted a negligence-based riskutility balancing test that assesses design defects in the context of reasonable manufacturer conduct.135 As the Bartlett Court correctly held, in New
Hampshire, if no reasonable conduct is available to a manufacturer, the
product is not defective and the manufacturer is not liable.136 The Court
should have stopped here.
2. The Court Instead Advanced Deterrence-Centric Tort Policy
That Over-Expansively Rejected Competing Compensatory
Considerations
In order to rebut the policy arguments of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent,
the Court diverged from the concerns of New Hampshire and adopted prodeterrence law-and-economic policy incompatible with compensatory considerations.137 The Court dismissed Justice Sotomayor’s attempt to balance
compensation and deterrence, and instead rejected any compensatory purpose behind strict products liability.138 Compensatory considerations, per

132. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (analyzing liability on a spectrum with “stricter” as the metric of comparison).
133. See, e.g., Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014) (preempting
Maryland’s consumer expectations approach to strict products liability); Fullington v. PLIVA,
Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014) (preempting Arkansas’s consumer expectations approach following Drager).
134. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 (citing Price v. BIC Corp., 702 A.2d 330, 333 (N.H. 1997))
(“cautioning ‘that the term “unreasonably dangerous” should not be interpreted so broadly as to
impose absolute liability on manufacturers or make them insurers of their products’”); id. (citing
Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988)) (“We limit the application of
strict tort liability in this jurisdiction by continuing to emphasize that liability without negligence
is not liability without fault.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. Id. at 2475. The test also weighs the product’s usefulness and desirability to society;
however usefulness was not in dispute in Bartlett. See id. (outlining test).
136. See id. at 2475–77.
137. See id. at 2473–80 (rejecting compensation as absolute liability, mandating an independent manufacturer capability to escape liability, deriding the stop-selling rationale, and interpreting
liability as preemptible affirmative requirements); see also supra notes 7, 13 and accompanying
text(discussing the conflicting functions of tort liability).
138. Compare Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (distinguishing breach of strict liability duties from
absolute liability compensatory risk-spreading), with id. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“New
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the Court, are either the result of absolute liability, which is universally rejected,139 or serve only to promote private deterrence.140 Any risk-spreading
that results from strict liability the Court rejected as inefficient.141
The Court further limited strict products liability by foreclosing the
possibility of a duty to compensate.142 Under the Court’s deterrence-centric
tort policy, a duty to compensate is untenable; manufacturers must have an
avenue to “escape liability.”143 Otherwise, a manufacturer is found at fault
for doing no wrong and is counter-productively deterred to an inefficient
end.144 For this reason, the same majority Court in both PLIVA and Bartlett
engrafted an independent action requirement onto the preemption inquiry:
to hold a tortfeasor liable, it must be capable of unilateral preventative action.145 Given the Court’s alternating treatment of “tort-as-compensation”
and “tort-as-regulation,” its explicit rejection of tort law’s compensatory
function is incorrectly expansive.146

Hampshire’s law, which mandates compensation only for ‘defective’ products, serves both compensatory and regulatory purposes.”).
139. Id. at 2473–74 (majority opinion); see also AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases rejecting absolute liability).
140. See, e.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (concluding that Bartlett’s private action serves a
regulatory, not compensatory, purpose); see also POSNER, supra note 13, at 244 (reasoning that if
the sole function of compensation is deterrence, compensation serves no purpose when there is
nothing to deter). The Court’s deterrence-centric policy dictates that the only reason plaintiffs
receive the deterrence-payment is to incentivize private enforcement. See POSNER, supra note 13,
at 244.
141. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (rejecting risk-spreading as a purpose of strict liability). Risk spreading is more efficiently achieved in the private insurance market with lower administrative costs. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 254 (discussing administrative costs).
142. Cf. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477–78 (rejecting the stop-selling rationale as rendering impossibility preemption meaningless because every conflict could be resolved in if the tortfeasor
ceased acting). Similarly, a duty to compensate would resolve every conflict. But see Part IV.C
detailing the warranty-based origins of strict products liability that provided quasi-contractual remuneration.
143. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475.
144. Cf. POSNER, supra note 13, at 244 (discussing the inefficiencies of overcompensation and
thereby over-deterrence). Deterrence for conduct outside of a company’s control can create contradictory incentives that induce the company to engage in more socially costly alternatives. Cf.
id. (discussing overcompensation).
145. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476 (discussing the manufacturer’s inability to take preventative action); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011) (citing to Wyeth for a unilateral action requirement). The Wyeth Court, however, established that available unilateral action
was one means to defeat impossibility preemption, not the only means. Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 568–73 (2009).
146. See Sharkey, supra note 7, at 460–71 (discussing the Supreme Court’s alternating treatment of tort-as-regulation and tort-as-compensation); compare PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577–78,
2580–81 (preempting state failure to warn claims as conflicting regulatory requirements), with
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571–72 (finding no conflict between state and federal regulatory requirements).
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3. The Court’s Erroneous Distinction Between Strict and Absolute
Liability Reduces State Autonomy and Invites Over-Simplistic
Preemption
While harmless in negligence-based New Hampshire, the Court’s dichotomous construction of negligence-based “strict” liability and jurisdictionally verboten absolute liability overlooked the traditionally “stricter” liability middle ground, and thereby instigated preemption of valid, albeit
minority, state tort schemes.147 Strict liability, unlike absolute liability,
does not transform manufacturers into insurers for their products.148 Under
an absolute liability regime, manufacturers can be liable even if nothing is
wrong with their product.149 Strict products liability, however, is limited to
unreasonably dangerous, defective products.150 If a court finds a product
unreasonably dangerous, then by definition the product has something
wrong with it and the court is not imposing absolute liability.151
The Court employs an absolute liability straw man to erroneously reject compensatory arguments and preserve a fault-based tort liability system. The Court’s reasoning is syllogistic: (1) all jurisdictions reject absolute liability;152 (2) Justice Sotomayor’s compensatory concerns would
impose absolute liability;153 (3) therefore, all jurisdictions reject compensatory concerns. The error lies in the second premise; the Court mischaracterizes all liability without conventional fault as absolute liability.154

147. See infra note 160 (discussing federalism); see also infra Part IV.C (listing states that
define unreasonably dangerous design defects in terms other than manufacturer conduct).
148. OWEN, supra note 2, at 256–57, 288; see also AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases to support that “[t]he doctrine of strict liability has never
meant absolute liability”).
149. See OWEN, supra note 2, at 257, 257 n.108 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability by
explaining “something must be wrong with a product before a court will hold a seller responsible”
under strict liability). Whereas strict liability creates a heightened duty, absolute liability effectively eliminates the duty and breach elements altogether.
150. OWEN, supra note 2, at 256–57; see also AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases to identify limitations on strict liability).
151. See OWEN, supra note 2, at 256–57 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability). “Defective” was added to § 402A to prevent an overbroad interpretation of “unreasonably dangerous”
that assessed absolute liability when an inherently dangerous product performed as designed. 38
A.L.I. PROC. 87–89 (1961).
152. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2013) (rejecting absolute liability); AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 2, § 16.5 (collecting cases).
153. Compare Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473–74, 2474 n.1 (finding absolute liability to not impose affirmative duties), with id. at 2479 (concluding that dissent would ignore common-law duties).
154. See id. at 2473–74, 2474 n.1 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability based on the absence of fault). But see supra text accompanying note 151 (inferring fault when something is
wrong with the product). The Court does not explicitly use the term “fault” in its definition of
absolute liability. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473. The subsequent reasoning, however, makes clear
that the imposition of legal duties is synonymous with fault. Compare id. (“an ‘absolute-liability
regime’ . . . does not reflect the breach of any duties”), with id. at 2474 (“We limit the application
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The Court acknowledges states’ freedom to adopt the liability regime
of their choosing: be it absolute liability, strict liability, or any “stricter” liability there between.155 In practice, however, the Court fails to account for
the historically “stricter” variations.156 Strict products liability originated
from the law of warranty in which liability was “‘strict’ because it [was]
based not on a supplier’s fault . . . but on the frustration of consumer expectations of product safety.” 157 While possibly closer to absolute liability
than its modern fault-based counterparts, this consumer expectations approach remains distinct.158
The Court’s sharp, aspirational dichotomy, however, implicitly suggests that any regime short of imposing “true absolute liability” creates a
preemptible duty sounding in negligence-based strict liability.159 By generalizing, as opposed to limiting its ruling to New Hampshire’s majority, riskutility, approach, the Court in effect legislated the only tenable law for design-defect claims: one that is preempted by FDA regulations. The Court’s
expansive approach sounds the death knell for traditional strict products liability in contravention of principles of federalism.160
B. Justice Sotomayor’s Law and Economic Tort Policy Supports the
Traditional Compensatory Role of State Tort Liability in the
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
Channeling the law and economic works of Judge Guido Calabresi,
Justice Sotomayor raises legitimate compensatory policy concerns in opposition to the Bartlett Court’s over-expansive construction of fault.161 Justice

of strict tort liability . . . [by] emphasiz[ing] that liability without negligence is not liability without fault.” (quoting Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
155. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (acknowledging the possibility of a “true absolute
liability state-law system”); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (characterizing liability
on a spectrum with the term “stricter” as the metric).
156. See id. (“most common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk” (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–24 (2008))).
157. OWEN, supra note 2, at 245, 247. Over the decades, however, fault crept back into
“strict” liability as courts increasingly applied principles of foreseeability and risk-utility balancing, transforming “strict” products liability into a sobriquet for negligence. Id. at 245.
158. See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text (distinguishing liability for product defects from absolute liability that applies regardless of something wrong with the product).
159. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1 (rejecting risk spreading as absolute liability).
160. See supra text accompanying note 157 (discussing the origins of strict liability). States’
ability to experiment is fundamental to the American system of justice. POSNER, supra note 13, at
893.
161. E.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (cautioning against “remov[ing] all means of judicial recourse” (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
251 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Sharkey, supra note 7, at 466–71 (chronicling the Court’s pro-tort-as-compensation precedent and recognizing the “strong state interest in
compensating victims”).
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Sotomayor states that the function of pharmaceutical tort liability is to protect and compensate.162 This distinctly Calabresian approach is antithetical
to a fault-based regime bound solely to the deterrence of wrongful conduct.163 Justice Sotomayor would instead loosen the requirements of fault,
consistent with a “stricter,” more traditional, treatment of liability, to ensure
compensation.164
Justice Sotomayor does not advocate abandoning the primary deterrent
role of tort liability.165 She necessarily, however, subordinates the Court’s
concerns with counter-productive deterrence166 to secure compensation for
plaintiffs.167 In addition to the considerations of justice,168 compensation
serves two economic purposes: it internalizes product dangers into prices;169
and diminishes the societal costs170 associated with “social and economic
dislocations”171 arising from concentrated losses.172 Both economic “pur-

162. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“strict-liability regimes . . .
serve[] both compensatory and regulatory purposes”); see also id. at 2484–85 (explaining that legislative history indicates Congress meant to supplement the protection and compensation offered
by state regulation and common-law liability). Congress has preserved common-law liability for
generic prescription drugs even while expressly preempting liability for medical devices. Id. at
2484, 2484 n.2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012)).
163. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 240–42 (characterizing fault as an oversimplified bilateral
view of tort liability focused on the efficient division of costs to reduce the number of torts).
164. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2489 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (seeking to impose liability
absent available preventative action); see also supra text accompanying note 157 (discussing traditionally “stricter” liability); infra Part IV.C (examining tort regimes clinging to “stricter” liability standards). Liability serves no deterrent purpose if the manufacturer has no available action to
deter.
165. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“As is typically true of strictliability regimes, New Hampshire’s law, which mandates compensation only for ‘defective’ products, serves both compensatory and regulatory purposes.”).
166. See supra notes 140, 144 and accompanying text (discussing inefficient over-deterrence).
167. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491–92, 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (seeking to impose
liability as a cost of doing business to secure a remedy for a seriously injured consumer).
168. See id. at 2485 (describing tort liability’s “important remedial role”).
169. POSNER, supra note 13, at 232 (“Strict liability in effect impounds information about
product hazards into the price of the product, causing a substitution away from hazardous products
by consumers who may be completely unaware of the hazards.”). Efficient internalization, however, is limited to unknown dangers. Id. When consumers are cognizant of risks, they will privately insure. Id. As evidenced by Ms. Bartlett’s case, the consumer market for pharmaceuticals
is characterized by unknown dangers and under-insurance; therefore economic policy dictates
compensation. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 230–31 (D.N.H. 2011)
aff’d, 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (suggesting Ms. Bartlett had no
knowledge of the risks of sulindac).
170. The societal costs are the economic waste that results from an ill-prepared individual being unable to bear the damages and becoming a drain on society. Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at
42, 44–45 (detailing disruptive costs and economic dislocations arising from concentrated losses
from accidents).
171. Id. at 43–45 (referencing “the problem of poverty”).
172. Cf. id. at 39–45 (framing an individual’s losses from an accident in terms of pain or utility). But see Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s the Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64
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poses” are derived from the assumption that consumers will act rationally
and efficiently if given sufficient information and resources.173
Justice Sotomayor advocates transforming tort liability into a cost of
doing business.174 This Calabresian Enterprise Liability approach allocates
liability to the party best able to spread the otherwise concentrated losses
(“lowest cost avoider”)175 and reduce administrative transfer costs.176 Sensitive to the injustice of deterring “faultless” parties, Justice Sotomayor implicitly adopts the proposition that “it is only fair that an industry should
pay for the injuries it causes.” 177 Justice Sotomayor does not recommend a
system in which no relation exists between the payer and the victim.178 Instead, she implicitly assigns lowest cost avoider status to the party “most
likely to cause the burden”—generic pharmaceutical manufacturers—to
diminish inadvertent deterrence.179 Enterprise liability is not naturally so
constrained, and, in fact, the brand manufacturer may prove a more efficient
candidate given its greater control over the product.180 Mutual Pharmaceutical, however, could also serve as an efficient loss spreader by internalizing
the cost of liability into prices.181

MD. L. REV. 12, 16 (2005) (criticizing the Costs of Accidents because loss of utility is not an economic cost).
173. See DEWEES ET AL., supra note 7, at 189–90 (using the availability of information to explain the impact of liability regimes). With perfect information, producers will take cost-justified
accident avoidance (precautions); similarly consumers will take care). Id.
174. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
175. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 50–51, 143–44. Concentrated losses refer to large economic
costs accrued against one person over a short amount of time. Id. at 39. Economic waste and inefficiency are reduced when losses are borne by parties able to pay, such as insurance companies.
Cf. at 39, 50–51 (outlining the benefits to the individual).
176. Id. at 50–51, 150. Enterprise Liability is a common-sense approach that assigns liability
to the enterprise that caused the harm. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–01 (1961) [hereinafter “Calabresi, Some Thoughts”].
177. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reasoning the manufacturer
of an unreasonably dangerous drug should pay compensation); Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra
note 176, at 500 (“[I]t is only fair that an industry should pay for the injuries it causes. . . .
[L]osses should be borne by the doer, the enterprise, rather than distributed on the basis of fault.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). In Bartlett, fault is contested, but causation is undisputed.
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
178. See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 22–23 (correcting the myth that there is a “necessary
financial link between injurers and victims”); Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 176, at 514
(“Proper resource allocation militates strongly against allocating to an enterprise costs not closely
associated with it . . . .”).
179. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (seeking to impose manufacturer liability as a cost doing business); see also Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 176, at 505
(“the loss should be placed on the party which is most likely to cause the burden”).
180. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570–73 (2009) (discussing brand manufacturers
ability to independently change labeling); see also CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 50–54 (describing
Enterprise Liability).
181. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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Justice Sotomayor justifies allocating tort liability as a cost of doing
business by differentiating statutory mandates from common-law liability.182 She argues that, though the punishment may be identical, a manufacturer that violates a statutory mandate breaks the law; whereas a manufacturer that accrues liability has not broken any law.183 She reasons that this
moral distinction translates into a material difference in social and legal expectations: statutory mandates are expected to evoke specific, compliant
performance, whereas common law liability evokes only an amoral, economic choice.184 This economic incentive model removes state tort liability
from considerations of fault and immunizes common-law claims from federal preemption.185
Justice Sotomayor’s departure from fault-based liability is particularly
significant in light of the codification of negligence within “strict” products
liability by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.186 While many jurisdictions
have only selectively adopted the Restatement Third, a weakened version of
strict products liability has largely pervaded the legal system.187 For those
states concerned by the weakened compensatory function of tort law, Justice Sotomayor outlines a policy roadmap to justify reverting state “designdefect” liability to its traditionally “stricter” origins.188
C. Post-Bartlett the Court’s Impossibility Preemption Reasoning Has
Been Expansively Applied to Preempt “Stricter” Liability Tort
Schemes
In the wake of Bartlett, courts have engaged in large-scale preemption
of state common-law claims against generic manufacturers.189 While many
182. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (distinguishing paying a
fine from breaking the law).
183. Id.
184. Id. Justice Sotomayor compares this distinction to National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), where a condition that the triggers a tax does not
equate to a “legal command” to take specific action. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2491 n.8.
185. But see supra Part IV.A (characterizing the Bartlett Court’s reasoning as subjecting all
common-law claims to potential preemption).
186. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The Restatement (Third) of Torts “largely
dismantles” the traditional framework of Restatement Second § 402A and, as a result, many states
have declined to adopt it. OWEN, supra note 2, at 246.
187. See supra note 2 (describing adoption of Restatement Third); see also infra note 202
(chronicling the transition towards negligence-based liability).
188. See supra notes 148–151, 154, 179 and accompanying text (contradicting the Court’s
assertion that fault is the distinguishing factor between strict and absolute liability); see also infra
notes 203, 204 (detailing the stricter origins of state common law).
189. E.g., Johnson v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 613 (5th Cir. 2014) (preempting
Louisiana law); Eckhardt v. Qualitest Pharm., Inc., 751 F.3d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 2014) (preempting
Texas law); Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014) (preempting Maryland law); Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2013) (preempting
Tennessee law); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1290 (10th Cir. 2013) (preempting Okla-
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of the preempted state claims were directly analogous to New Hampshire,
some proved materially distinguishable.190 In one such case, Drager v.
PLIVA USA, Inc.,191 the Fourth Circuit preempted Maryland’s consumer
expectations test, interpreting Bartlett to preempt all state strict-liability
claims.192 The court reasoned that regardless of the method used to calculate an “unreasonably dangerous” design defect, Bartlett mandates that
companies must have an avenue to escape liability and finds federal law
eliminates all means for them to do so.193
Both the Eighth Circuit and Pennsylvania initially protested the categorical application of preemption, absent state-specific analysis, but Drager
has since become the dominant approach.194 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
in Drager is problematic because the Bartlett Court mandate—that manufacturers must have an avenue to escape liability—is derived from New
Hampshire’s risk-utility test, not the Restatement Second Section 402A in
homa law and noting “[i]t is for the state courts . . . to engage in the delicate policy considerations
predicate to the expansion of the scope of state tort law”); Wagner v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 13-cv-497jdp, 2014 WL 3447476, at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 11, 2014) (preempting Wisconsin law); Fullington
v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014)
(preempting Arkansas law); Wilson v. Amneal Pharm., L.L.C., No. 1:13-CV-00333-CWD, 2013
WL 6909930, at *14 (D. Idaho Dec. 31, 2013) (preempting Idaho law); Ko v. Mut. Pharm. Co.,
Inc., No. C-13-00890-RMW, 2013 WL 5692375, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) (preempting California law); Gardley-Starks v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-099-SA-JMV, 2013 WL 5423951, at *3
(N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2013) (preempting Mississippi law); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 965
F. Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (preempting New York law).
190. See, e.g., Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739, 746–47 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In contrast to
New Hampshire’s risk-utility approach, Arkansas state courts focus on consumer expectations in
determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. Consequently, it is not immediately
clear whether Arkansas, unlike New Hampshire, offers generic drug manufacturers an opportunity, consistent with federal obligations, to somehow alter an otherwise unreasonably dangerous
drug. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal . . . and remand.” (citations omitted)); Neeley v.
Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-325 JAR, 2013 WL 3929059, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July
29, 2013) (“Likewise, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s analysis of defective design cases focuses
on consumer expectations. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss.” (citation omitted)). On remand from Fullington, the court followed Drager. Fullington, 2014 WL 806149, at
*3.
191. 741 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2014),
192. Drager, 741 F.3d at 477–78.
193. Id.; cf. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2493 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinion at
2475 for the proposition that a company must have an avenue to escape liability). Another way of
stating the Drager reasoning is that common-law claims create a manufacturer duty to take steps
to lessen unreasonable danger, and that this duty is impossible to perform under Bartlett. Drager,
741 F.3d at 477–78. The court in Drager also argued that a risk-utility approach would apply because the drug at issue malfunctioned and Maryland engages in a risk-utility inquiry for malfunctioning products. Id. at 478 n.2.
194. Fullington, 720 F.3d at 746–47; Hassett v. Dafoe, 74 A.3d 202, 211–12, 217 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2013), appeal denied 99 A.3d 926 (Pa. 2014) (table). But see In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2014 WL
1632149, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014) (following Drager); Fullington, 2014 WL 806149, at *3
(“The Fourth Circuit is correct: whether a state follows the risk-utility approach or the consumerexpectations approach does not affect the application of Bartlett.”)
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general.195 Nothing in the Restatement Second forecloses a duty to compensate.
Necessary and insurmountable to the Bartlett holding is the bevy of
New Hampshire common law that rejects any form of liability without
fault.196 Consistent with this ideology, New Hampshire adopted a riskutility test that only imposes liability if reasonable preventative measures
were available (duty) that were not taken (breach).197 Under this approach a
product manufacturer “must have a way to ‘escape liability’”—preventative
action must be available—or it cannot be found at fault.198 Fault, however,
is a state construct subject to state discretion.199 If a state chooses to infer
fault, or otherwise lessen the preconditions to find fault, the need for an
“escape liability” requirement evaporates.200 Via the consumer expectations
test, several states, Maryland included, have done just that.201
The consumer expectations test pre-dates the risk-utility approach and
is derived from the law of implied warranty rather than negligencebalancing.202 The test harkens back to the original adoption of strict products liability when a manufacturer was “subject to liability to the . . . consumer even though [it] . . . exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of the product.”203 Whereas a risk-utility test eliminates liability when
a manufacturer exercises all possible care, a consumer expectations test
195. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474–75 (deriving the escape liability requirement from a negligence-based, risk-utility duty to improve product safety with reasonable and available manufacturer conduct). By the same token, the prohibition of the stop-selling rationale relied upon in
Drager is dependent on a risk-utility, negligence-based approach.
196. Id. at 2473–74.
197. See id. at 2475–76 (reasoning that the risk-utility test is premised on manufacturers having a duty to take reasonable preventative action).
198. See id. at 2493–95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2475 (majority opinion)) (discussing the “automatic conflict” because of a manufacturer’s inability to act).
199. See supra notes 155–160 (discussing federalism and fault).
200. See, e.g., Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (distinguishing strict and absolute liability noting
that strict liability “still signals a breach of duty”). If this breach of duty is inferred, the manufacturer’s ability to escape liability is immaterial.
201. See Dawn M. Goulet & Mark R. Miller, Show v. Ford and the Continued Role of the
Consumer-Expectation Test in Illinois Product Liability Litigation, 15 TRIAL J. 47 n.6 (Winter
2013) (collecting cases). Drager is the primary authority for preemption of the consumer expectations test; other jurisdictions have merely followed suit. E.g., Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d
1133, 1140–41 (8th Cir. 2014) (relying on Drager); Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236
JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014) (following Drager).
202. OWEN, supra note 2, at 291–93. The consumer expectations test was the dominant approach in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but the majority of courts transitioned to a risk-utility balancing
approach because the consumer expectations test proved poorly adapted to cases involving obvious dangers, atypical victims, or complex product designs. OWEN, supra note 2, at 293–99. Under the risk-utility test, a product is considered defective if the costs of prevention are less than the
safety benefit. OWEN, supra note 2, at 301. This test is indistinguishable from negligence.
OWEN, supra note 2, at 300–01.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. a. (1965); see also OWEN, supra note
2, at 256 (discussing § 402A).
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does not assess a manufacturer’s exercise, non-exercise, or inability to exercise any degree of care; manufacturer conduct, available or not, is not part
of the inquiry.204
Similarly, the Maryland consumer expectations test is concerned with
protecting justified consumer expectations, not with ensuring that companies have an avenue to escape liability.205 “The relevant inquiry . . . focuses
not on the conduct of the manufacturer but rather on the product itself.”206
Under Maryland’s test, a defect, or breach of duty, is inferred whenever a
product is deemed more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would contemplate.207 This inference distorts manufacturer duties and comparatively
relaxes fault.208 This “stricter” liability, however, remains distinguishable
from absolute liability.209 While Maryland’s test offers little guidance regarding the scope of manufacturer duties, the Maryland Court of Appeals
discussed compensatory policy when adopting its strict liability approach.210
204. Compare OWEN, supra note 2, at 292 (discussing consumer expectations) with OWEN,
supra note 2, at 303 (outlining liability under the risk-utility test). The difference in scope between the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests is compensatory. Rational actors only take
precautions that are cheaper than the sanction. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 535. Therefore, under either liability regime, manufacturers will stop taking
precautions at the same, non-cost-effective point. Id. The only difference is liability beyond the
cost-effective threshold.
205. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 350–53 363 A.2d 955, 962–63
(1976) (adopting strict liability in Maryland to establish warranty-like liability without standard
warranty defenses or proof requirements).
206. Phipps, 278 Md. at 344, 363 A.2d at 958; see also Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 133
F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Phipps clearly explains the fundamental difference between negligence and strict liability in [the above quoted] terms.”).
207. Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 368 Md. 186, 193–95, 792 A.2d 1145, 1150 (2002);
Phipps, 278 Md. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963 (“Proof of a defect in the product at the time it leaves the
control of the seller implies fault on the part of the seller sufficient to justify imposing liability for
injuries caused by the product. Where the seller supplies a defective and unreasonably dangerous
product, the seller or someone employed by him has been at fault in designing or constructing the
product.”).
208. Compare Halliday, 368 Md. at 195–96, 200–03, 792 A.2d at 1151, 1154–55 (explicating
Maryland’s modern consumer expectations test at length without mentioning duties), with Mut.
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74 (2013) (explaining New Hampshire’s risk-utility
test in terms of duties).
209. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 351–52, 363 A.2d at 963 (“[T]he theory of strict liability is not a
radical departure from traditional tort concepts. Despite the use of the term ‘strict liability’ the
seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any injury resulting
from the use of his product.” (emphasis added) (citing Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis.
1967))). Liability is only imposed when a product malfunctions.
210. Phipps, 278 Md. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958 (“Various justifications for imposing strict liability in tort on manufacturers have been advanced by the courts. It has been said that the cost of
injuries caused by defective products should in equity be borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market . . . . It has also been suggested that imposing strict liability on manufacturers for defective products is equitable because it shifts the risk of loss to those better able financially to bear the loss. Another reason advanced is that a consumer relies upon the seller in expecting that a product is safe for the uses for which it has been marketed, and that this expectation
is better fulfilled by the theory of strict liability than traditional negligence or warranty theories.
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The court in Drager did not conduct any specific analysis of the Maryland consumer expectations test.211 The court instead relied on the Bartlett
Court’s over-simplified reasoning that state law based on Restatement Second Section 402A creates a manufacturer duty to reduce the unreasonably
dangerous nature of its products; a duty frustrated by federal law regardless
of the state’s definition of “unreasonably dangerous.”212 While the simplest
approach is to treat all common law based upon the Restatement Second
alike—and if the Restatement was a recent adoption, this approach would
be reasonable—five decades of common law evolution in states with divergent liability schemes suggests that a categorical approach is overly simplistic.213 Whereas federal law invalidates New Hampshire’s finding of
fault under its risk-utility approach, no conflict arises if Maryland infers
fault under its consumer expectations test. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s
preemption of the Maryland consumer expectations test in Drager, while an
accurate reflection of the Bartlett Court’s over-expansive reasoning, failed
to account for states’ ability to alter the “duties” created by strict liability.
The subsequent adoption of the Drager reasoning by other jurisdictions is
similarly suspect.214
The consumer expectations test has many distinct jurisdictional variants.215 Some jurisdictions have adopted a hybrid approach by inserting the

And still another reason advanced is that the requirement of proof of a defect rendering a product
unreasonably dangerous is a sufficient showing of fault on the part of the seller to impose liability
without placing an often impossible burden on the plaintiff of proving specific acts of negligence.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 958 n.3 (referencing Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts supra note 176, at 499).
211. Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 477–78 (4th Cir. 2014).
212. Id. (“The Court in Bartlett did not determine that the New Hampshire law was preempted
because it applied the risk-utility approach. Instead, it concluded that there was no action that the
defendant could take . . . to avoid strict liability.”). The court’s interpretation of Bartlett is accurate; its application, however, is unfortunate because it presumes that the Maryland consumer expectations approach only assesses liability if a company fails to take action. No such conflict exists.
213. E.g., Phipps, 278 Md. at 343–53, 363 A.2d at 958–63 (adopting Restatement Second
strict liability nearly four decades ago). Unlike other Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, impossibility preemption does not lend itself to expansive application. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett,
133 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Impossibility pre-emption ‘is a demanding defense’ that requires the defendant to show an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between federal
and state legal obligations.” (citation omitted)); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589–90,
593–94 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (distinguishing impossibility preemption
from broader doctrines such as Congressional purposes and objectives preemption).
214. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (8th Cir. 2014) (relying on
Drager to preempt Missouri’s undefined, “collective intelligence” approach); In re Yasmin & Yaz
(Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF,
2014 WL 1632149, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014) (relying on Drager to preempt Illinois’ Consumer Expectation test); Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, at
*3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014) (adopting the reasoning of Drager to preempt Arkansas’ consumer
expectations approach).
215. OWEN, supra note 2, at 298, 485–86, 485 n.56, 489.
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consumer expectations test into the risk-utility balancing test.216 Other
states, however, have clung to a pure consumer expectations test either exclusively or as an alternate to risk-utility.217 For those states with warrantybased consumer expectations strict liability, courts should not presume
Bartlett impossibility preemption.218 Instead, courts should engage in a
state-specific analysis of the scope of fault, the nature of manufacturer
common-law duties, and the legal necessity of an avenue to escape liability.
D. Responding to Expansive Bartlett Preemption, the FDA Proposed a
Rule to Render Bartlett Moot and Reinstate Generic
Pharmaceutical Products Liability
On November 13, 2013, the FDA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking that would amend its CBE regulation to bring ANDA (generic)
manufacturers into parity with NDA (brand) manufacturers.219 If issued,
the amendment would reinstate generic manufacturer strict products liability by “eliminat[ing] the preemption of certain failure-to-warn claims” by
PLIVA and Bartlett.220 The FDA specifically addressed the arbitrary disparity resulting from Wyeth and PLIVA, noting that liability turns upon a
pharmacist’s whim.221 The cited purpose of the rule, however, is not expressly compensatory; rather, the rule is intended to rectify the disincentives
created by preemption by “ensur[ing] that generic drug companies actively
participate with FDA in ensuring the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of drug safety labeling.”222
216. OWEN, supra note 2, at 297–98, 489, 489 nn.82–83; see also Goulet & Miller, supra note
201, at 46 n.5 (collecting cases).
217. See OWEN, supra note 2, at 293, 293 n.356, 485, 485 nn.56–57.
218. Hassett v. Dafoe, 74 A.3d 202, 211-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), appeal denied 99 A.3d 926
(Pa. 2014) (table) (“Absent from the vast majority of [Bartlett preemption] cases is the identification of state law duties associated with various causes of action and a cogent analysis of how they
conflict with federal law, which is the hallmark of an impossibility pre-emption determination.
Furthermore, as the Bartlett Court’s analysis of New Hampshire law illustrates, pre-emption issues are state-law specific.”). Hassett held: “without a careful analysis of the applicable state law,
pre-emption of all design defect claims is premature. . . . Thus, we agree with the trial court that
blanket dismissal of all claims on pre-emption grounds . . . is unwarranted.” Id. at 217.
219. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67989 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013). In addition to changing the CBE provision of 21 C.F.R. 314.70(c)(6), the FDA proposed creating a corresponding exception under the misbranding provision of 21 C.F.R. 314.150(b)(10)(iii) to allow for temporary
differences in labeling. Id. at 67994.
220. Id. at 67988–89.
221. Id. at 67988 (“As a result of the decisions in Wyeth . . . and P[LIVA] . . . access to the
courts is dependent on whether an individual is dispensed a brand name or generic drug.”).
222. Id. at 67989. Communication breakdowns are not a theoretical problem. See, e.g., Huck
v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Iowa 2014) (“Although required by federal regulations to
mirror the brand defendant’s label, PLIVA did not update its metoclopramide packaging to include the new warning . . . . The record is silent as to why PLIVA failed to add that warning.”).
The FDA also intends the proposed rule to address the problem of orphaned ANDAs.
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The FDA reopened the comment period in early 2015 after “an explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act . . . supported . . . consider[ing] alternative solutions
to the proposed rule.”223 As of this writing, the FDA estimates a final rule
will issue in September 2015.224 In the previous comment period, just over
one hundred comments were submitted, largely from the generic pharmaceutical industry.225 The main industry concerns include consumer confusion arising from contradictory NDA and ANDA labeling and that generic
manufacturers ill-equipped to unilaterally alter labeling.226
If the rule goes into effect as proposed, generic pharmaceutical manufacturers will fall under the auspices of Wyeth unless Wyeth is overturned.227 Given the voting shift from Wyeth to PLIVA and Bartlett—the
Wyeth dissent functionally became the PLIVA and Bartlett majority—
predicting Wyeth would be overturned is not without merit.228 The conflict
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67986, 67988. The FDA notes: “[a]mong drugs for which a generic version is available, approximately 94 percent are dispensed as a generic.” Id. at 67988. As such,
brand manufacturers may discontinue marketing after generic entry, effectively orphaning related
ANDAs. Id. Given this trend, the FDA notes that “it is time to provide ANDA holders with the
means to update product labeling.” Id.
223. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products; Public Meeting; Request for Comments; Reopening of the Comment Period, 80
Fed.
Reg.
8577,
8577–78
(February
11,
2015),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0081 (citing 160 CONG.
REC. H9314 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014) (statement of Rep. Rogers)).
224. FDA, Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
REGULATIONS.GOV
(last
visited
Mar.
24,
2015),
Biological
Products,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500 (outlining docket and timetable).
225. See id. (summarizing rulemaking docket).
226. See FDA, Memorandum of Meeting with GPhA (September 8, 2014), REGULATIONS.GOV
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2013-N-0500-0080 (detailing concerns). Disparate labeling for the same pharmaceutical, however, has existed for decades among drugs with multiple NDA versions. See for example acetaminophen or ibuprofen.
Furthermore, any confusion created by the rule would be temporary; CBE changes still require
FDA approval, and, upon approval, all other application holders would be required to follow suit.
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67992 (explaining the process via flow chart). The FDA also proposed
publishing all CBE-supplements on its labeling website. Id.
227. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570–73 (2009) (finding impossibility preemption
inapplicable because under the CBE provision Wyeth could unilaterally change labeling); see also
supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text (discussing Wyeth).
228. Compare Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Alito J., dissenting with Roberts, C.J, and Scalia, J.
joining), with PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2571 (2011) (Thomas, J., delivering opinion
with Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., and Alito, J., joining and Kennedy, J. joining in part) and Mut.
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2469–70 (2013) (Alito, J., delivering opinion with Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., joining). The operative question is: if Wyeth
was decided today, would it be decided differently? The structural differences are not probative:
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan replaced Justices Stevens and Souter, respectively, in the dissents
of PLIVA and Bartlett. Compare Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 556, 558 (Stevens J. delivering opinion with
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preemption divide, however, as evidenced by the doctrinal shift between
Wyeth and PLIVA, and then confirmed by Bartlett, suggests that a reversal
of Wyeth is unlikely.229 Justice Alito’s Wyeth dissent advocated broad federal objective preemption based on the common-sense conflict between
laymen juries declaring a drug unreasonably dangerous and FDA experts
declaring it safe.230 In contrast, the majority in Bartlett does not mention
federal objective preemption once.231 If Justice Alito, writing for the Court,
had support for broader federal objective preemption, given his Wyeth dissent, he would have at least addressed broader preemption in Bartlett, if not
relied upon it entirely. Justice Thomas, however, as expressed by his Wyeth
concurrence, will not support federal objective preemption.232 Without the
support of Justice Thomas, if the FDA’s proposed rule goes into effect, Wyeth will then govern the generic pharmaceutical industry, ensuring compensation for individual litigants.
If the FDA rulemaking fails, however, states should look to Justice Sotomayor and Judge Calabresi for economic and equitable policy justifications to maintain states’ role in pharmaceutical oversight and to ensure
compensation for their injured citizens.233 States should also consider the
novel development of innovator (brand) liability advanced by judges in the
aftermath of PLIVA and Bartlett to find NDA holders liable for injuries
caused by their ANDA counterparts.234 Furthermore, legislatures should
Kennedy J., Souter J., Ginsberg J., and Breyer J. joining), with PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting with Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., and Kagan, J. joining) and Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
at 2480 (Breyer, J., dissenting with Kagan, J., joining) and id. at 2482 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
with Ginsburg, J., joining). The potential ideological change by Justices Thomas and Kennedy
may, however, prove dispositive.
229. Compare Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 605, 609–12, 626 (Alito J., dissenting) (arguing based on
federal objective preemption), with PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2580–81 (deciding with impossibility
preemption) and Bartlett 133 S. Ct. at 2476–77 (same); see also Sharkey, supra note 7, at 459,
471–72 (reporting that the common thread running through the Supreme Court’s alternating
treatment of tort-as-regulation and tort-as-compensation has been agency deference). For example
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–77 followed the FDA’s interpretation.
230. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 609, 626 (Alito J., dissenting); see also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (discussing Wyeth dissent).
231. See generally Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466. The only mention of federal objective preemption is by the dissents rebutting it as inapplicable. See supra note 108 (outlining the dissents’ rejection of federal objective preemption).
232. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (characterizing implied
preemption doctrines such as federal objective preemption as unconstitutional); see also supra
note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the Wyeth concurrence).
233. See infra Part IV.B
234. See, e.g., Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1101397, 2014 WL 4055813, at *23 (Ala. Aug. 15,
2014) (adopting “innovator liability” to hold brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers liable for
injuries caused by bioequivalent generic pharmaceutical drugs); Dolin v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., No. 12 C 6403, 2014 WL 804458, at *12–13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2014) (recognizing brandname liability for negligence even when a generic version caused the harm, but not for strict products liability); see also Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 414 (6th Cir. 2013)
(Stranch, J., dissenting) (echoing the Fullington dissent in advocating brand manufacturer liability
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consider compensatory economic policies in future lawmaking to diminish
concentrated losses and efficiently reduce the societal cost of accidents.
V. CONCLUSION
In Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court concluded
that design-defect common law liability creates a preemptible duty in impossible conflict with federal generic pharmaceutical regulations.235 While
correctly decided in New Hampshire, the Court’s reasoning discouraged
“stricter” constructions of the duty236 and thus invited erroneous preemption
of Maryland’s distinguishable calculation of design defect liability.237 The
erroneous preemption in Maryland was then adopted in several similarly
situated jurisdictions without significant state-specific analysis.238 As a result, for purposes of federal preemption, all state design-defect “strict” liability is treated as negligence.239 This treatment runs contrary to modern
principles of federalism and disregards legitimate compensatory policy concerns supporting traditional strict liability.240
The Court’s expansive reasoning is best explained through the lens of
law and economic tort policy. Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, advanced
compensatory policy that would transform design defect liability into a cost
of doing business.241 The Court responded with classic pro-deterrence policy that analogized a compensatory duty to absolute liability and supported
an expansive interpretation of FDA regulations.242
The Court’s sweeping impossibility preemption triggered backlash
from the FDA who proposed an amendment to its regulations to undermine
the impossibility in PLIVA and Bartlett and reinstate generic pharmaceutical liability.243 Though the rulemaking could render Bartlett moot, analysis
of the ideologies driving the Court’s decisionmaking remains instructive for
predicting the Court’s ongoing tort-as-regulation treatment of products liability.244
for generic drugs.); Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., 720 F.3d 739, 748 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (positing brand manufacturer liability for generic drugs); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850
N.W.2d 353, 403 (Iowa 2014) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (“[T]he universe of imaginable scenarios in
which an actor who has not manufactured or sold a product may nevertheless both cause and be
liable for damages caused is enormous.”).
235. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013).
236. See supra Part IV.A; see also supra Part IV.C (discussing the duties created by “stricter”
strict liability).
237. See supra Part IV.C.
238. See supra Part IV.C.
239. See supra Part IV.C.
240. See supra Part IV.A–C.
241. See supra Part IV.B.
242. See supra Part IV.A.
243. See supra Part IV.D.
244. See supra Parts IV.A–B.

